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Previous cross-national studies have suggested three primary theoretical explanations for public sector fiscal variations: an "institu tional
development" explanation; a "political effects" view; and an "economic
effects" hypothesis. Unfortunately, no systematic research has offered an
empirical test of the relative efficacy of these three views. The present
article reports such a test. The results of our research offer an interesting
composite explanation of nation-level public expenditure patterns. Before
examining the results of our -analysis, however, we will consider briefly
the theoretical antecedents for this work.
First , several scholars have argued ,that overall public expenditure
levels should reflect the "capacity" or institutional development of the
polity. An early statement of this view is that of Almond and Powell.1
They suggest that expenditure levels measure the "distributive capacity"
of a government, and that a principal determinant of government capacity is the extent of differentiation and specializaiion of the organizational apparatus of government. Similar implications for the meaning of
expenditure behavior can be drawn from Huntington's 2 treatment of
political "institutionalization." He argues that increasing size, scope, complexity , and age of official political structmes indicate increasing "institutionalization" and, hence, viability. Roughly similar views have been
offered by Diamant and Blank and Rustow. 3 Based on the preceding
theoretical discussions, we hypothesize that nations with well-institutionalized political systems should capture a larger proportion of the total
wealth of the society in the form of governmental expenditures.
1 Gabriel A. Almond and G. Bingham Powell, Comparative Politics: A Developmental Approach ( Boston: Little , Brown, 1966). pp. 198-199.
2 Samuel P. Huntington , Political Order in Changing Societies ( New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1968).
a Alfred Diamant and Blanche D. Blank, "Meauring National Bureaucracies: The
Interaction of Theory and Research," Journal of Comparative Administration 1 ( 1),
1969, p. 121; and Dankwart A. Rustow, A World of Nations (Washington, D. C.:
Brookings, 1967), p. 75.
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Tihe second major perspective on cross-national expenditures, emphasizing the importance of regime type or regime ideology is well articulated by Groth 4 who argues that it is systematic political differences
between types of regimes which account for public spending differences
among nations. Examinations of expenditure differences for democracies
and communist systems have been provided by Pryor and by Groth and
Wade. 0 Several related studies have compared variations in social welfare policies and expenditures with variations in system democratization,
usually measured in Western terms. 6 In the same vein, a number of
scholars !have contrasted the expenditure patterns 0£military as opposed
to civilian regimes. 7
The findings of empirical studies of regime types and expenditure
levels have been rather diverse. Groth 8 and Groth and Wade 9 have
found differences between democracies and communist systems they
attributed to regime type; Pryor 10 did not. Cutright's 11 early findings that
democratization was associated with spending and policy changes have
been ohallenged by Jaclanan's 12 more sophisticated analysis of this issue.
4 Alexander J. Groth, Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach ( New York:
Macmillan, 1971 ) .
5 Frederic Pryor, Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations
(Homewood, ill.: Irwin, 1968); Alexander J. Groth and Larry L. Wade, "Educational Policy Outcomes in Communist, Democratic and Autocratic Systems." paper
delivered at the American Political Science Association annual meeting, Los Angeles,
1970; and Alexander J. Groth and Larry L. Wade, "International Educational Policy
Outcomes," pp. 11-142 in D. Sidjanski (ed.) Political Decision-Making Processes
(San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1973).
6 Phillips Cutright, "Political Structure
Economic Development, and National
Social Security Programs," American JoumJ of Sociology, 70(5), 1965; pp. 537-550;
Phillips Cutright, "'Inequality': A Cross-National Analysis," American Sociological
Review, 32( 4), 1967, pp. 562-578; Phillips Cutright, "Income Redistribution: A CrossNational Analysis," Social Forces, 46(1), 1967, pp. 180-190; and Robert W. Jackman, "Political Democracy and Social Equality: A Comparative Analysis," American
Sociological Review, 39 ( 1). 1974, pp. 29-45.
7 Eric A. Nordlinger, "Soldiers in Mufti: The Impact of Military Rule Upon Economic and Social Change in the Non-Western States," American Political Science
Review, LXIV(4), 1970, pp. 1131-1148; Philippe D. Schmitter. "Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness. and Public Policy in Latin America: 1950-1967,"
pp. 425-506 in M. Janowitz and J. von Doom (eds.) On MilitanJ Intervention
(Rotterdam: Rotterdam University Press, 1971); R. D. McKinlay and A. S. Cohan,
"A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance of Military and
Civilian Regimes," Comparative Politics, 8( 1 ), 1975, pp. 1-30; R. D. McKinlay and
A. S. Cohan, "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Regime Systems," American Political Science Review 70(3), 1976, pp. 850-864; Robert W.
Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform: Military Governments and Social Change in the
Third World," American Political Science Review LXX(4), 1976, pp. 1078-1097.
8 Comparative Politics: A Distributive Approach.
9 "Ed ucational Policy Outcomes . . .;" and "International
Educational Policy
Outcomes ... "
10 Public Expenditures in Communist and Capitalist Nations.
11 "Political Structure, Economic Development . . ."
12 "Political Democracy and Social Equality .
"

36

JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

The literature on civilian versus military regime spending has gener ally
argued for significant diHerences in the outputs of such regimes. Nordlinger 13 and Schmitter 14 found significant differences in the outputs of
the two. However, McKinlay and Cohan 15 and Jackman's 16 more extensive analyses of this issue argue that regime type so distinguished
has no such independent effects. A central difficulty of all this last research is that it only examines spending differences for explicitly civilian
or military regimes. That is, it does not attempt to account for the general
influence of the military on public policy, regardless of the character of
the ruling elite. 17 It is the latter issue which our analysis examines.
A third view of nation expenditures has been that of some economists
such ,as Gupta 18 and Musgrave 19 who have examined the predictability
0£ national expenditures on the basis of per capita national income level.
Their concern is with the so called "rising share" hypothesis that changes
in per capita income levels should lead to similar changes in expenditure
levels as a proportion ,of the gross national product. Musgrave's evidence
bearing on this hypothesis is mixed, with diHerent findings for different
expenditure measures and for diHerent sets of countries grouped by per
capita income levels. However, he finds no general relationship between
per capita income and spending. Furthermore, he observes that the absence of any such finding may result from his failure to control for the
influence ofi any noneconomic factors.
To test the relative and combined explanatory capacity ofithese three
explanations, we have collected a large body of cross-national data. We
will describe briefly the character of our empirical measures and the
hypotheses which will be examined.
The Data
The sample for this study includes 79 independent nations at 1965.
These nations were chosen on the basis of two criteria: a population
greater than one million and data availability for the larger set of indicators from which the present variables are drawn. This group of
"Soldiers in Mufti . . ."
"Military Intervention, Political Competitiveness and Public Policy.. . ."
15 "A Comparative Analysis of the Political and Economic Performance . . .,"
and "Performance and Instability in Military and Nonmilitary Reginle Systems."
16 Robert W. Jackman, "Politicians in Uniform .. ."
17 Kim Quaile Hill, "Military Role vs. Military Rule: A Research Note on Allocations to Military Activities," Comparative Politics, 11 ( 3), 1979, 371-377.
18 S. P. Gupta, "Public Expenditure and Economic Development-A
Cross-Sectional Analysis." Finanzarchiv 28(1), 1968, pp. 26-41.
19 Richard Musgrave, Fiscal Systems ( ew Haven: Yale University Press,
1969), pp. 73-83.
13
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countries, which is generally representative of all regions except subSaharan Africa, is listed in the Appendix.
As dependent variables, we employ several different central government expenditure measures. The ratio of total current government expenditures to the GNP is employed as an index of the overall size of the
public sector. As measures of the character of government spending by
functional categories, we utilize spending in three specific areas operationalized in both of two ways. First, we have measures of total current
public spending on education, on health and welfare, and on military
goods and services as proportions of the GNP. Second, we examine the
proportions of total government spending devoted to the same three
functional categories.
Most of our spending data were derived from the United Nations
year book of National Accounts Statistics. 20 Missing data were filled in
from such supplemental sources as national yearbooks, central bank reports, and descriptive case studies. Our GNP data came from Taylor and
Hudson. 21 As a check against gross errors, our expenditure figures were
compared to available budget data, and the military spending data were
further compared with Stockholm International Peace Research Institute 22 figures. As a further test of the reliability of these variables, we
correlated the absolute expenditure figures for education and for military
purposes with the comparable data in the 1972 Taylor and Hudson
W orul Handbook. The latter data were gathered entirely independently
from our own and provide the only other single source for such figures.
(The Worul Handbook does not include data on total government spending or on health and welfare spending. ) The intercorrelations between
the comparable spending measures for both sets were quite satisfactory;
all the product moment con-elations exceeded 0.99.
Our independent variables were operationalized as follows. For the
concept "political institutionalization" or bureaucratization, we employ
two measures: The date of independence of the nation and the number
of government ministries in the central government. Both of these
variables are drawn from the World Handbook. The first is one proposed
explicitly by Huntington. 23 We recognize that rthese are weak operationalizations of a very abstract theoretical construct. However, we feel that
20 ( New

1969).

York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs,

Charles Lewis Taylor and Michael C. Hudson, World Handbook af Political
and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University Press, second edition, 1972).
22 Yearbook af World Armaments and Disarmaments, 1968/ 1969 (New York:
Humanities Press, 1969).
23 Samuel P. Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies.
21
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the hypothesized relationship is so important that even a weak test is
warranted.
For the general concept of regime ideology, we employ two distinct
measures. One of these is a Socialist Ideology Index, a judgmental scale
for rthe period 1945-1965 based on the criteria of Anderson, von der
Mehden, and Young.24 The 4 point ordinal scale ranges from completely
non-socialist nations to those characterized by "Militant, Mobilization
Socialism." Scores on this variable for most of the developing nations in
our sample were taken from Anderson, von der Mehden, and Young; the
remainder were coded by the authors.
The second ideology measure is an index of "Regime CoercivenessOpenness." The values on this index are factor scores from a single factored principal components solution derived from a set of regime characteristics measuring democratic process and regime ideology variations.
The individual variables were an Index of Legislative P,arty Fractionalization from Rae,25 an Index of Press Freedom from the University of
Missouri Freedom of Information Center, 26 an Index of Electoral Stability from the 1972 World Handbook, and a communist regime dummy
variable. The associations of the individual variables with the resultant
single dimension indicate that higher legislative fractionalization corvarys
with greater press freedom, more competitive and free elections, and
non-communist regimes. Consequently, the factor scores from this dimension provide a composite index of regime orientation. 27
As a measure of the importance of the military, we include an index
of the proportion of the working age population in the military. This
variable is taken from Russett, et al.28 This particular measure, rather
than an index of military versus civilian control ofi formal political institutions, is utilized in order to assess the general influence of the military
in politics rather than simply their appropriation of political control.
In addition to the preceding measures based on the three primary
theoretical perspectives to be tested, we include in our analysis three
24 Charles Anderson, Fred von der Mehden, and Crawford Young, Issues af
Political Development ( Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1967).
25 Douglas Rae, The Political Consequences af Electoral Laws ( New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967).
26 School of Journalism, University of Missouri at Columbia, "Wor ld Press
Freedom, 1966," Freedom of Information Center Report No. 181.
27 The factor loadings on this single dimension were: Legislative Fractionalization, -0.83; Press Freedom, -0.92; Electoral Stability, -0.78; and the communist
regime dummy variable, 0.75. The eigenvalue was 2.71.
28 Bruce M. Russett, H. R. Alker, Karl W. Deutsch, and Harold D. Lasswell,
World Handbook af Political and Social Indicators (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1964).
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control variables. The latter include: ( 1) ,an index of ethnic cleavage ,29
( 2) population size, and ( 3) population density. The first of these
variables allows us to control for possible effects of divisive ethnic
politics on public policy. The last two measure social traits of the
character of given populations which may also independently influence
public expenditure patterns.
In the analysis below we will first examine the bivariate associations
between our expenditure measures and the hypothetically important independent variables. Then we will examine the relative importance of
individual independent variables by means of multiple regression analysis.30
Associations with Spending a,s a Proportion of Gross National Product
In this section we examine the correlates of various spending measures as a proportion of gross national product. Table 1 presents the
bivariate Pearsonian correlations with these expenditure variables. If
one surveys the results in that table, ,almost all of the expenditure variables
have a moderate ,association in the appropriate direction with an institutionalization, an ideology, and an economic wealth independent
variable.
29 The social cleavage index is a composite measure based on the factor scores
on the single principal component derived from the factor analysis of three measures
of this concept. The original variables and their factor loadings were indices of Group
Discrimination ( 0.73) , Separatist Potential ( 0.75), and Ethnolinguistic Fractionalization (0.88). The first two of these were taken from Ted Gurr, New Error-Com,.
pensated Measures for Comparing Nations (Princeton: Princeton University Center
of International Studies, 1966). The third variable was taken from the second
edition of the World Handbook of Political, and Social Indicators.
ao We should note at this point two additional observations about our treatment and interpretation of the data. First, we have transformed via logarithms all those
variables with extremely skewed distributions in order to make them more suitable for
regression analysis. The variables so transformed are population, population density,
gross national product per capita, the number of government ministries, and military
personnel per capita. Second, we also considered the extent of intercorrelation among
our independent variables-a potential problem which could threaten our ability to
make inferences about the relative importance of different independent variables.
However, those associations are generally quite low and appear to pose no such
difficulty. The average Pearsonion r among our independent variables was 0.17. The
highest r was 0.51 between population and the number of government ministries.
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TABLE 1
Bivariate Associations with Expenditure
Measures as a Proportion of GNP
Total
Expenditures/
Ind ependent Variables
GNP
o. of government
ministries . . . . . . . . . . . . .43
Date of Ind epend ence . . . .11
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .34
"Openness-Coerciveness"
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29
Military Personnel/c apita . . .17
GNP/ capita ..........
... 34
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . .09
Population density .......
-.14
Social Cleavage Index .... -.14

Edu.cation
Expenditures/
GNP

Health & W elf.
Military
Expenditur es/ Expenditures/
GNP
GNP

.31
.03
.23

.21
-.08
.32

.36
.07
.22

.09
.21
.40
-.08
-.24
-.15

.13
.16
.55
-.13
.02
-.19

.25
.38
.05
.19
-.08
.10

For the total spending / G P measure four of the correlations are of
notable magnitude. Size of the governmental establishment has the
highest Pearsonian r, indicating that political institutionalization as measured by this variable is an important correlate of the size of the public
sector. Other especially prominent associations are those for GNP/ capita,
Socialist Ideology, and the "Openness-Coerciveness" Index. This last
variable indicates that communistic systems and those with less fractionalized legislatures and more coercive characteristics have higher public
spending to national wealth ratios. The remaining independent variables
are only weakly correlated wtih the total spending index.
For the categorical spending variables, the associations are genera lly
a bit weaker. Yet, in every case at least two independent variables have
moderate correlations as hypotihesized. For education spending , per capita
wealth and size of the government bureaucracy are the best correlated
variables. Also, Socialist Ideology has a moderate correlation in the appropriate direction. The negative relationship with population density
suggests that there may be some spending economies associated with
more densely settled populations.
For health and welfare spending, per capita wealth is the best associated variable , indeed, this is the strongest correlation in the entire
table. Socialist Ideology and size of the bureaucracy also have moderate
associations in the expected direction.
Th e militru.y spending measure is best explained by the military
personnel index, size of the bureaucracy, and the regime coerciveness
measur e. Interestingly, Socialist Ideology is positively associated with
military expenditure / GNP while per capita wealth is virtually unassociated with that dependent variable.
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If we survey all the results in T,a,ble 1, size of .the bureaucracy,
wealth, and Socialist Ideology iare the most potent independent variables.
'I'bus, all three of the principal theoretical perspectives are given some
support by these ,bivariate resu1~. But other variables also are prominent
with some individual spending measures, indicating the appropriateness of separate theoretical explanations for each. It should also be noted
that age of national institutions and population size were virtually inconsequential explanatory variables, and population density was prominent
only in regard to educational spending. Also, while the Social Cleavage
Index indicated that spending of all kinds was slightly lower in more
divided societies, the variance shared with this variable was very low in
every case.
Because none of the preceding correlational results was particularly
large in absolute magnitude of the r 2 , it is probable that a multivariate
explanation is needed to account for any sizable portion of the variation
in spending levels. In Oil"derto explore such an avenue, we fitted full
multiple regressions to our spending variables employing all of the
independent variables discussed above save age of the national institutions. These multiple regression results are reported in Table 2.
The regressions are reasonably successful with approximately 40
percent variance explained in three of the four cases. For military
spending the explained variance falls to 29 percent. Across all these
regressions, the most prominent explanatory variables are size of the
bureaucl'acy, wealth per capita and Regime Coerciveness-Openness. Yet,
other independent variables are important for some of the spending
measures.
In fact, the results in T,able 2 support different explanatory rationales
for each of the four dependent variables. For example, the overall size
of public sector spending ( as measured by total spending/ GNP) is a
function of several variables including wealth, bureaucratization, political regime characteristics, and even population density to a lesser
extent. Thus, there is no single predominant explanation for variations
in the "scope of governmental authority." Instead, a variety of forces
can operate to increase the size of the public sector. It may be that a
single characteristic like wealth or ideology might determine whether a
particular nation has an especially high or especially low total spending
ratio. However, these cross-sectional results indicate that no one of the
independent variables we examined could be called a general explanation for differences in the size of the public sector.
Educational spending variations, on the other hand, are shown in
Table 2 to be largely a function of wealth and of size of the bureau-
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TABLE 2

--

Multiple Regressions with Expenditure Measures as a Proportion of GNp
Standard
Error

Standardized
Coefficient

.092
Govt. Ministries .........
GNP/ cap ...............
.042
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .007
.040
Coerciveness-Openness
Military Personnel/cap. . .. -.011
Population Density .......
-.018
Population .... . .........
-.003
Social Cleavage Index .. . . -.016
(constant) ........
. .-.234

.032
.013
.009
.013
.012
.009
.010
0.12

.335
.376
.080
.336
-.094
-.201
-.034
-.135

0.65 0.42

Govt. Ministries ..... .. .. .012
.006
G P/ cap . . .............
Socialist Ideology .. . ..... .001
Coerciveness-Openness ... .002
Military Personnel/cap. . . . .0003
Population Density ..... . .-.003
Population .. . ...........
-.002
Social Cleavage Index .... -.002
(constant) ..... . .. . . -.013

.005
.002
.001
.002
.002
.001
.001
.002

.306
.359
.082
.132
.020
-.262
-.158
- .088

0.60 0.36

Govt. Ministries .... . .... .006
G P/cap ...............
.023
Socialist Ideology . . .. . . . . .003
Coerciveness-Openness
.012
Military Personnel/cap . ... -.006
Population Density . .. ... -.0004
Population ..... . .. . ..... -.002
Social Cleavage Index .... -.002
(constant)
.........
-.121

.011
.004
.003
.004
.004
.003
.003
.004

.067
.644
.123
.308
-.157
-.013
-.064
-.048

0.66 0.43

Govt. Ministries .. . ..... . .013
.. . .......
-.001
G P/cap
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . .002
Coerciveness-Openness
.001
Military Personnel/cap. . . . .009
Population Density .......
- .002
Population . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .001
Social Cleavage Index . . . . .002
(constant) ..........
.004

.007
.003
.002
.003
.003
.002
.002
.003

.237
-.066
.093
.056
.387
-.132
.042
.099

0.54 0.29

Expenditure
Measure

Independent
Variable

Total Spending
as Pct. GNP

Education
Spending as
Pct GNP

Health and
Welfare
Spending as
Pct. GNP

Military
Spending as
Pct. GNP

Regression
C oefjicient

R

R•
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cracy. Thus, political and ideological differences among nations are not
important in their influence on this variable. The negative influence of
population density probably reflects a special characteristic of educational public service facilities. Schools, perhaps more than any other
kind of service facility, must be geographically proximate to client populations. Less dense populations must build a greater number of facilities
in order to achieve acceptable accessability. In addition, there is little
substitutibility across different kinds of elucational institutions. An
elementary school cannot substitute for a high school the way a health
clinic often can for a hospital. Thus, it is plausible that population
density has a greater negative influence on education spending than on
military or health and welfare allocations. 31
For health spending the predominant explanatory variable is per
capita wealth. This finding suggests that health and welfare activities
may be a "surplus" governmental phenomenon. Only after more essential services have been provided or higher priority needs met will such
spending rise. Thus, it is essentially wealth variations rather than political or institutional ones which dete1mine health and welfare spending.
The only qualillcation to this view arises from the important but weaker
influence of Regime Coerciveness. This probably reflects the great concern of communist societies with population health levels. While it is
important, this influence is certainly secondary to that with wealth levels.
For military spending yet another rational is indicated by our results.
Our empirical results indicate that neither wealth nor domestic political
variations are related to military spending variations. In fact, our ability
to account for military spending variations was comparatively weak.
These results indicate that military spending is an important priority
for diverse kinds of polities-rich, poor, competitive, coercive, and so on.
Evidently, domestic political and social characteristics of nations have
only limited independent capacity to explain military spending variations. One important reason for this finding, of course, lies in the special
prominence of internation influences on military expenditure levels.82

Associations with Categorical Spending Levels as Proportions of the
Total Budget
In this section we examine a somewhat different dimension of public
fiscal behavior-the correlates of categorical spending as a proportion of
Sl For within-nation evidence supporting this view see Kim Quaile Hill, "The
Within-Nation Disbibution of Public Expenditures and Services," American Journal
of Political Science XX(2), 1976, pp. 303-318.
3 2 On this point, see Kim Quaile Hill, "Domestic Politics, International Linkages,
and Military Expenditure Levels," Studies in Comparative lntemational Development
XIII.I) 1978, pp. 38-59.
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total spending. That is, we examine here allocations within the total
budget package as opposed to categorical allocations relative to total
societal wealth. Budgetary allocations reflect the importance of different
activities as a portion of all government activities, whereas spending
proportionate to GNP reflects the importance of governmental activities
relative to gross societal resources. The empirical results we obtain in
this section are somewhat different from those in the preceding analysis.
After explaining the present findings, we will explicate the broader
meaning of both analytic approaches.
In table 3 we present the bivariate associations among our various
independent variables and the three categorical spending measures as a
proportion of total expenditures. The most striking aspect of these
correlations is their generally low magnitude.

TABLE 3

Bivariate Associations with Categorical Spending Measures as a
Proportion of Total Expenditures
Independent Variables

Education
Expend4tures/
Total Spending

No. of govt. ministries
........
. -.06
Date of Independence ... . .. . ........
-.12
Socialist Ideology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .03
"Openness-Coerciveness" Index .......
-.15
Military PersonneVCapita . . . . . . . . . . . . .05
GNP/ capita . .. . .. . .. .. . . . . .........
.15
Population ... . .... . .......
. ........
-.27
Population density .. .. .. . .. . ... .. . . .-.20
Social Cleavage Index . . ..... . .. . .. .. -.ITT

Health & Welf.
Expenditures/
Total Spending

Military
Expenditures/
Total Spending

.03
-.19
.21

-.01
-.01
.06
.14
.18
-.17
.09
.02
.11

-.05
.10

.55
-.15

.05

-.22

For education spending the largest associations are the negative
ones with population size and density. Per capita wealth has a slight
positive influence and regime coerciveness a similar negative one on this
dependent variable. Yet, none of these variables shares as much as 10
percent common variation with the educational spending measure.
The health and welfare variable exhibits the only truly sizable
association in the table-that with per capita wealth, the two variables
sharing about 30 percent common variance. Socialist Ideology has a
lesser positive association here, while the Social Cleavage Index and
Date of Independence have slight negative associations with health
spending.
The military spending measure demonstrates the weakest associations of all three dependent variables in Table 3. It's highest r is the
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o.18 with military personnel per capita. GNP per capita has a negative
association of comparable magnitude and regime coerciveness a slight
positive association. As with the two other categorical spending measures
in Table 3, many of these findings are in the hypothesized direction;
yet, most are of inconsequential magnitude.
Given the weak bivariate results in Table 3 we examined multiple
regression results for the same dependent variables in hopes that a
multivruiate model would better account for spending variations. Employing all the independent variables in Table 3, we were only able
to explain 13 percent of the variation in education spending •and 12 percent of that in military spending. Because the fit of these models was so
poor, we have not reproduced the results in a separate table. They add
nothing significant to our understanding beyond the bivariate results
repoited above.
In the multiple regression model with health and welfare spending
as a percentage of total government spending 35 percent of the variance
in health spending is accounted for. Yet, 30 percent of the total variance
is explained by the positive influence of per capita wealth alone, and
no other variable has a significant independent influence on health spending.
On first glance, the results in this section appear disappointingly
weak and difficult to assimilate with those of the preceding analysis.
While the association of many of our independent variables with categorical budgetary allocations is in the hypothesized direction, in most
cases the magnitude of the relationship is very weak. In shoit, we cannot account well for variations in such budgetary ·allocations on the basis
of this rather diverse set of independent variables. In order to understand the meaning of these findings we must incorporate them with
those of the preceding section, taking account of the different substantive meanings of our dependent variables.
Conclusions
In order to provide an adequate summary explanation of our results,
we must examine separately the results for the policy area of education,
health and welfare, and the military. These explanations should also
provide some theoretical linkage for the different multivariate results
for each of our two spending measures in each policy area. Additionally,
we must incorporate in ,these explanations the influence of thos·e control
variables which, although they were not included in our three primary
hypotheses, were also considered as plausible explanatory variables.
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In the area of education our results show that wealth and governmental institutionalization best account for spending relative to the
G P. None of our primary independent variables bas much of an influence , however, on education spending as a proportion of total spen ding.
On the average, then, rich and poor nations spend a roughly compar able
portion of their budget on education, but a wealth effect associated with
higher per capita GNP allows the wealthier nations to devote larger
p01tions of total societal resources to this area. Finally, none of our
other predictors indicates impoitant conditions under which the rela tive
budgetary priority of education would change. At best, the correlates
of that variable in Table 3 reflect a slight economy of scale associated
with larger and more densely settled populations . This finding agrees
with om earlier discussion of the relatively unique locational imperatives which constrain the disposition of educational capital.
When we tum to om various results for health and welfare spending, the situation changes . Initially, we determined that health expenditures relative to the GNP were predominately a function of per capita
wealth and to a lesser extent regime coerciveness. Only per capita
wealth had a sizable independent influence on the proportion of the
budget devoted to health and welfare expenditures. The strong relationship of per capita GNP to health spending as a portion of GNP suggests
what we termed above a wealth effect. As in the case of education,
wealthier societies devote a larger portion of total resources to this
policy area. The second finding with health spending as a porti on of
the total budget indicates a wealth-related priorities effect. Thus,
wealthier societies also accord health ,and welfare a greater priority
related to all other governmental activities, and health and welfare
policies receive the benefits of two distinct kinds of allocational chan ges
associated with increasing national wealth. The combination of these
two influences is unique to this policy area among the three examined
here.
In the case of military spending we also have a distinct set of
findings explainable in issue-specific terms. Our initial results with
spending relative to the GNP were that the size of the military establishment ,and, more weakly, the institutionalization of the governme ntal
bureaucracy were impoitant independent predictors. Yet, we were not
able to account for as much of the variation in military spending/ GNP
as we were with education ,and health. Furthermore, our corre lations
with military spending as a portion of total spending were especially
weak. Surprisingly even the size of the military establishment had only
a slight positive effect on this variable . All these findings sugge st that,
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compared to the other categorical spending measures, military allocations are relatively less explainable by the nation attributes analyzed
here. Especially noteworthy are the findings that neither wealth nor
regime ideology differences account for military spending variations.
Thus, various kinds of nations-rich, poor, coercive, competitive-have
fairly similar military spending priorities on average. This generalization
is appropriate for both of the ways in which we have examined governmental priorities.
Finally, om analysis for the size of the public sector ( total spending/ GNP ) indicated several independent variables that have unique
effects upon that spending measure. Richer nations, those with more
institutionalized political systems and those with more coercive and
"closed" political systems tended to have larger government budgets
relative to their societal wealth. Yet, none of these influences on total
spending overwhelms the others in explanatory capacity. A multivariate
model is necessary to account for any signillcant portion of total spending variations, and a substantial amount of total variance remains unexplained nonetheless.
Generalizing beyond the specific results of our empirical analyses,
some broader conclusions are also indicated. First, we have shown that
all three of these separate theoretical perspectives discussed in our introduction have some validity. In the terms of recent debate over the
determinants of spending levels for other units of analysis, political,
social, and economic infrastructme variables all have unique influences
on some kinds of spending variations.
Despite the preceding conclusion, our results also indicate that
broad theoretical perspectives have only limited explanatory capacity
in this area. Our statistical analyses based on these perspectives could
only account for moderate proportions of the expenditure variations
among nations, even in the best cases. These results indicate that considerable theoretical work is needed to identify more potent explanatory
models.
It would appear that a final aspect of •our own work points to the
major direction which future research should pursue. Our discussions
of categorical expenditme variations suggest that issue specific explanations are necessary to account for allocational differences within given
policy areas. Thus, future research will likely profit from less concern
with aggregate public spending and greater attention to the unique
policy problems, priorities, and constraints of implementation associated
with specific issue areas.
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APPENDIX
List of Nations Included in the Study
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
10
11

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24

25
26
27
28

29
30
31
32
33
34

35
36
37
38
39
40

Afghanistan
Argentina
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Bolivia
Brazil
Bulgaria
Burma
Cambodia
Canada
Ceylon
Chile
China Mainland
China Taiwan
Colombia
Costa Rica
Cuba
Czechoslovakia
Denmark
Dominican Republic
East Germany
Ecuador
El Salvador
Ethiopia
Finland
France
Ghana
Greece
Guatemala
Haiti
Honduras
Hungary
India
Indonesia
Iran
Iraq
Ireland
Israel
Italy

41 Japan
42

Jordan
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Liberia
Libya
Malaysia
Mexico
Morocco
Netherlands
New Zealand
Nicaragua
Norway
Pakistan
Panama
Paraguay
Peru
Philiptnes
Polan
Portugal
Romania
Saudi Arabia
South Africa
South Korea
Spain
Sudan
Sweden
Switzerland
Syria
Thailand
Tunisia
Turkey
UAR
United Kingdom
Uruguay
USA
USSR
Venezuela
West Germany
Yugoslavia

43 Lebanon
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63
64
65
66
67
68
69
70
71

72
73
74
75
76
77
78
79

